Why Biden’s long-range missiles won’t save Ukraine

Atacms can help Kyiv hold Kursk but cannot dramatically change the course of the war

Copy link
twitter
facebook
whatsapp
email
Copy link
twitter
facebook
whatsapp
email
Joe Biden’s decision to allow Ukraine to fire US-supplied missiles at targets inside Russia could help Kyiv hold on to its bridgehead in Kursk Oblast, giving it a valuable card at anticipated peace talks.
But that good news is laced with a more depressing truth.
The decision has been so carefully calibrated to minimise the risk of escalation, and so laden with precautionary limitations, that it cannot dramatically change the course of the war.
“Yes, the Atacms will help in Kursk, and yes, it is absolutely too little and too late,” said Andrei Zagorodnyuk, a former Ukrainian defence minister.
The first limitation is geographic.
Initial reports suggest that permission to fire Atacms (which stands for army tactical missile system) into Russia applies only to Kursk Oblast, where Ukraine is trying to hold on to a small foothold to use as a negotiating chip if and when Donald Trump forces the sides into peace talks.
That is not a bad thing in and of itself. Russian and North Korean troops are already counterattacking in a bid to recapture it before Mr Trump’s inauguration in January.
Being able to hit rail heads, command posts, and mustering points deep inside the region will certainly make a difference to the Ukrainian defence, said Mr Zagorodnyuk.
But the fighting in Kursk is tactical in character, with both sides using highly dispersed, small unit assaults to take or retake ground.
Many of the best targets in Atacms range – hundreds of airbases and other military installations in the Smolensk, Kaluga, Bryansk, Tula, Lipetsk, Belgorod, Voronezh, Rostov and Krasnodar regions – are still out of bounds.
So yes, Ukraine may be able to target some ammunition, weapons, and troops mustering hubs inside Kursk.
“But that is assuming Russia has not already dispersed them. And it is my understanding that they have,” said Konrad Muzyka, the director of Rochan, an independent open source intelligence consultancy based in Poland. “So the targets available to the Ukrainians will be limited.”
The second limitation is related to time. Too much has been allowed to pass.
The first time Ukraine received precision missiles from the West, in autumn 2022, they really did change the game.
The GMLRS rockets first provided with US-made Himars wreaked havoc on Russian command and control and logistics and played a key role in the success of Ukrainian offensives in Kherson and Kharkiv.
But that was two years ago.
Russia has had ample time to adapt, both by dispersing logistics and troop concentrations and in developing jamming and interception capabilities.
After a year of asking, Ukraine first received Atacms, which are fired from the same launch vehicles but have a 300km range, in late 2023.
They were used to devastating effect on Russian-occupied Ukraine, including in several high-profile strikes on air bases in Crimea.
But the public debate about letting them fire into Russia itself has dragged on so long that Moscow has already taken countermeasures.
As long ago as August, the Institute for the Study of War assessed that Russia had redeployed aircraft from at least 16 airbases inside Atacms range.
Much of this delay is down to American concern about managing the risk of direct escalation with Russia.
The North Korean presence in Kursk helps the White House paint the Atacms deployment as inside the unwritten rules of the escalation game: Russia raised the stakes first by bringing in foreign troops.
Trailing the decision in The New York Times, rather than waiting for the missiles to announce their own arrival with explosions deep in Kursk Oblast, is also in keeping with the Biden administration’s long-standing policy of giving Russia fair warning.
But from a war-fighting point of view, said Mr Zagorodnyuk, “it looks quite strange”.
He added: “Frankly, lots of people in Ukraine are very confused by this decision making. Why does it have to be reactive? Why shouldn’t it be proactive to help Ukraine win the war, even if it is a partial victory?”
“Why do we have to wait until Russia escalates and then reacts? That doesn’t make any sense at all. It should start with goals. It shouldn’t start with reacting to someone else’s goals.”
That general lack of strategy has bedevilled the Western support effort since the war began.
The dearth of surprise brings us to the third constraint: quantity of rockets.
In September 2023, while the original decision to supply Atacms was being debated, Kyrillo Budanov, the Ukrainian military intelligence chief, told US website the WarZone that “if it is 100 missiles, it will not change the situation”.
Asked how many Ukraine needed, he replied: “At least hundreds.”
The exact numbers of Atacms Ukraine has received and how many it has left are secret.
But we do know that some US defence officials have resisted sending large numbers to Ukraine because America’s own stockpiles are limited and needed to meet its defence commitments elsewhere – specifically in the Pacific.
In short, it is probably a limited stockpile.
Russia has claimed success in shooting down and jamming the GPS guidance systems of GMLRS and Atacms rockets.
While the actual interception rate is difficult to confirm, it cannot be assumed that each of those left will reach its target.
“It is all about the number of missiles. If the Ukrainians had hundreds of Atacms left we would be looking at the Russians finding it more difficult to adapt and suffering from much heavier losses,” said Mr Muzyka.
“If it is going to be 100 left, then that is not a number that is going to have a big impact on this operation, let alone the war.
“So the question is: will the United States provide more Atacms to Ukraine before Donald Trump assumes office?”
There is no clear answer to that question.
Copy link
twitter
facebook
whatsapp
email